since F KK < 0 and−2ρ − ρ K j + λ K − j < 0. The latter inequality follows because −2ρ − ρ K j + λ K − j = −ρ (K) 2 + ρ (K)K/ρ (K)(s K j + λ (1 − s K j )) , where s K j is firm j's share of capital and the expression in brackets is positive because ρ (K)K/ρ (K) ≥ −1. To see this, note
The fact that F LL · F KK − F 2 LK is positive (since F is concave) implies that the determinant of the matrix of second derivatives is positive, which is the last condition we needed to establish strict concavity of the objective function. From the first-order conditions, it is then clear that the reaction functions are continuous, and therefore a Nash equilibrium exists.
To prove that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, we consider the system of FOCs when employment and capital are symmetric across firms, and show that there is a unique solution. From the FOC for labor, we can solve for labor as a function of capital, obtaining:
Replacing this in the FOC for capital, we obtain an implicit equation for capital:
The limit when K → 0 + of this expression is +∞, while the limit when K → E − is −∞. The derivative of this expression with respect to K is negative, which implies that there is a unique solution to the equation. The two-equation characterization of the equilibrium obtains directly from imposing symmetry in the FOCs of the firm.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
(a) We start by noting that the number of firms J and the common ownership parameter φ enter the equilibrium equation for capital only through market concentration H. We then use the equilibrium equation for capital to define capital as an implicit function of H ∈ (0, 1]:
Taking log and derivative with respect to log H yields
which is decreasing in H and increasing in K. Since H increases when the number of firms decreases or common ownership increases, and K decreases with them, L must decline with both lower J and higher φ . (g) We can obtain:
All else equal, given that ε KH < 0 the expression above is minimized for γ = 0 for which it becomes:
Thus, a sufficient condition for the real interest rate markup µ * K to be increasing in H is that the elasticity of (equilibrium) capital with respect to H be low enough:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
As in Azar and Vives (2018), the competitive equilibrium relative price of sector n's good is 
The derivative with respect to L jn is, as in Azar and Vives (2018):
The derivative with respect to K jn is similar:
Also similarly to Azar and Vives (2018) , the derivatives of the relative price in other sectors m = n are given by:
The first-order condition of firm j with respect to L jn is
The first-order condition with respect to K jn is
In a symmetric equilibrium, similarly to Azar and Vives (2018), the first-order condition with respect to L n j simplifies to
bined labor market share of the other firms in sector n, and s jn ≡ F(K jn , L jn )/c n is the product market share of firm j in sector n.
Analogously, the first-order condition with respect to K jn simplifies to
where s K jn ≡ K jn /K is the capital market share of firm j in sector n, s K − j,n ≡ ∑ k = j K kn /L is the combined capital market share of the other firms in sector n.
In a symmetric equilibrium the labor market share of firm j in sector n is 1 JN , its capital market share is also 1 JN , and its product market share is
, and defining µ L = F L /ω − 1, the first-order condition with respect to L jn can be written as
Similarly, since
, and defining µ K = F K /(ρ − 1 + δ ) − 1, the first-order condition with respect to capital can be written as
Solving for 1 + µ * L and 1 + µ * K , we obtain 1 + µ * L = 1 + H labor /η 1 − H product − λ inter (1 − 1/N) /θ 1 + µ * K = 1 + H capital /(ε(K) (1 − (1 − δ )/ρ(K))) 1 − H product − λ inter (1 − 1/N) /θ , which are the expressions for the markdowns in the proposition.
